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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-4640 
___________ 
 
FABIAN AGUILAR-MARTINEZ, 
      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DONNA ZICKEFOOSE, WARDEN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-07167) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 15, 2012 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  April 4, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In 2005, the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska sentenced 
Fabian Aguilar-Martinez to 322 months in prison for conspiring to distribute and 
possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and use or 
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 
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U.S.C. § 924(c).  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, and the 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 
 In 2007, Aguilar-Martinez filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the 
sentencing court denied as untimely.  The Eighth Circuit denied Aguilar’s subsequent 
motion for a certificate of appealability.  Also, in 2009, Aguilar-Martinez filed a motion 
that he described as a motion for restructuring his term of imprisonment, which the 
sentencing court denied an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion. 
 In the District Court, in 2011, Aguilar-Martinez filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  He raised four claims, which the District Court 
listed verbatim on page three of its memorandum, and which we will summarize as 
follows:  (1) the Government failed to establish that he violated § 924(c); (2) the trial 
court erred in charging the jury; (3) the trial court improperly defined reasonable doubt; 
and (4) counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue on appeal that the 
Government did not establish a § 924(c) violation.  The District Court dismissed the 
petition for lack of jurisdiction, noting that it could entertain the petition only if § 2255 
were an inadequate and ineffective remedy, and concluding that § 2255 was not 
inadequate or ineffective. 
 Aguilar-Martinez filed a notice of appeal.  However, he did not submit the filing 
and docketing fees or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“ifp”).  As a consequence, 
on January 24, 2012, his case was dismissed for failure to timely prosecute.  In a letter 
dated January 29, 2012, and received by this Court on February 3, 2012, he moves to 
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reopen his case.  He asserts that he expected to receive the form for filing an ifp motion 
and another related form, as he had received in the past, but they had not arrived.  He also 
claims that he filed an ifp motion in the District Court with his notice of appeal.1
 We will grant Aguilar-Martinez’s timely filed motion to reopen.  L.A.R. Misc. 
107.2(a).  We also grant his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.  Upon consideration of 
the merits of this appeal, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court 
because no substantial issue is presented on appeal.  See L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
  With 
his motion to reopen, Aguilar-Martinez submits a motion to proceed ifp. 
The District Court was without jurisdiction to consider Aguilar-Martinez’s claims 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  As the District Court concluded, Aguilar-Martinez cannot bring 
his claims under § 2241, because a motion to challenge his conviction and sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not “inadequate or ineffective.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 5.   
Section 2255 has been considered inadequate and ineffective for a petitioner 
convicted and imprisoned for conduct since deemed not to be criminal.  See In re 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997).  However, § 2255 is not inadequate or 
ineffective just because a movant, like Aguilar-Martinez, who has previously filed a 
§ 2555 motion and has been unsuccessful in an attempt to again present claims to the 
sentencing court, is unable to meet its stringent gatekeeping requirements.  See id. 
                                              
1 This assertion is not supported by an entry on the District Court docket, which notes 
that no filing fee or ifp application was submitted. 
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Although Aguilar-Martinez argued to the contrary in the District Court, he did not 
make a claim that fits under the In re Dorsainvil exception.  He did not contend that, as a 
result of a Supreme Court decision issued after he filed his first § 2255 motion, the 
conduct for which he was convicted is now non-criminal.  In fact, the cases he relied on  
to support his claims, like Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), and Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990),  predate his 
§ 2255 motion and his conviction. 
In short, Aguilar-Martinez presented claims for which § 2255 is not an inadequate 
or ineffective remedy.  The District Court properly dismissed his § 2241 petition.  
Accordingly, having granted Aguilar-Martinez’s motion to reopen this proceeding, we 
will affirm the District Court’s decision. 
